Lyng v. Castillo
| Lyng v. Castillo | |
|---|---|
| Argued April 29, 1986 Decided June 27, 1986 | |
| Full case name | Lyng, Secretary of Agriculture v. Castillo et al. |
| Citations | 477 U.S. 635 (more) 106 S. Ct. 2727; 91 L. Ed. 2d 527; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 72 |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas |
| Holding | |
| The statutory definition of "household" did not violate the appellee's rights to due process. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Stevens, joined by Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor |
| Dissent | Brennan |
| Dissent | White |
| Dissent | Marshall |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amend. V | |
Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986), reversed a lower court's decision that the change in the statutory definition of a household violated the appellee's due process rights. The program rules for food stamps were changed in 1981 and 1982 which changed the definitions of households. The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the District Court erred in using heightened scrutiny to analyze the validity of the household definition.
Earlier, the Supreme Court ruled in Department of Agriculture v. Moreno (1973) that a provision of the Food Stamp Act of 1971 was unconstitutional because a household, if an unrelated individual lived in it, would have its benefits reduced or eliminated.