Davis v. Washington
| Davis v. Washington | |
|---|---|
| Argued March 20, 2006 Decided June 19, 2006 | |
| Full case name | Adrian Martell Davis, Petitioner v. Washington; Hershel Hammon, Petitioner v. Indiana |
| Docket no. | 05-5224 |
| Citations | 547 U.S. 813 (more) 126 S. Ct. 2266; 165 L. Ed. 2d 224; 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4886; 74 U.S.L.W. 4356; 19 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 299 |
| Argument | Oral argument |
| Case history | |
| Prior | On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Washington; on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Indiana; State v. Davis, 154 Wn.2d 291, 111 P.3d 844, 2005 Wash. LEXIS 462 (2005) Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 2005 Ind. LEXIS 541 (Ind., 2005) |
| Subsequent | On remand at, Remanded by Hammon v. State, 2006 Ind. LEXIS 793 (Ind., Sept. 7, 2006) |
| Holding | |
| A 911 phone call describing an "ongoing emergency" is not testimonial in nature, and thus may be admitted at trial even if the caller is not available without violating the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. | |
| Court membership | |
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| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Scalia, joined by Roberts, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito |
| Concur/dissent | Thomas |
| Laws applied | |
| Crawford v. Washington, Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. | |
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States and written by Justice Antonin Scalia that established the test used to determine whether a hearsay statement is "testimonial" for Confrontation Clause purposes. Two years prior to its publication, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” The Supreme Court declined to define "testimonial" in Crawford which left lower courts without any guidance. However, in Davis v. Washington, along with Hammon v. Indiana which was consolidated with Davis, the Court clarified the meaning of "testimonial" and articulated a new standard.
Specifically, the Court stated that:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
The Court further developed this standard in Michigan v. Bryant.